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1 Introduction
To what extent are economic policies in democratic societies distorted by the competitive
struggle for votes? How strong is the impact of the economy on election results? These are
important questions which have received considerable attention from researchers at least
since the 1970s.1 The most recent evidence on the political business cycle suggests that
the magnitude of electoral budget cycles increases with the size of the rent that politicians
can earn by remaining in o¢ ce and with the share of uninformed voters in the electorate
(Shi and Svensson, 2006); that opportunistic scal manipulations are more pronounced in
"new" than in "established" democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005) but that, conditional
on the degree of scal transparency, political business cycles are equally likely in advanced
industrialized economies (Alt and Lassen, 2006) and the misallocation of public spending is
likely to endure, even though countries gain experience in electoral politics (Vergne, 2009).
Moreover, the evidence also supports the view that benign economic conditions, as well
as pre-election scal manipulations, help politicians win elections (Frey and Schneider,
1978a,b; Alesina et al., 1993; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Drazen and Eslava,
2005).2
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new test of the rational political business
cycle theory (RPBC) developed by Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988) and Rogo¤ (1990). For that
purpose, we develop and empirically test a novel extension of the RPBC model. This
theory has previously been tested by looking for distortions in scal outcomes before
elections, but not by studying its implications for the joint determination of the win-
margin of the incumbent and the scal distortion. The theory predicts that competent
politicians manipulate budget decisions before elections to signal their competency and
in that way to increase their chance of winning. In other words, not only is scal policy
distorted in predictable ways before elections, but these distortions should increase the
expected win-margin of the incumbent. The theory also implies that the incentive to
1See, e.g., Goodhart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and Kramer (1971), Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs
(1977) and Alesina (1987).
2A dissenting view is presented by Brender and Drazen (2008), who nd that running decits in an
election year is not an e¤ective tool to help reelection.
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distort policy depends on the expected win-margin. The nature of this feedback from
prospective electoral success to pre-electoral scal manipulation is, however, complex.
The key attribute of the theory is that the win-margin and the scal distortion created by
opportunistic politicians are jointly determined. Empirical relations explaining these two
variables should therefore be estimated together to properly test the theory.
To set the stage for our test, we rst develop a version of the canonical RPBC model.
We use the model to derive the two reduced-form equations to be estimated, to make
precise predictions about the nature of the two-way relationship between the win-margin
and the opportunistic distortion, and to motivate the exclusion restrictions needed to
estimate the two-way relationship empirically. We then estimate these equations on data
from 278 Portuguese municipalities from 1979 to 2005 (eight elections) using a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator. Data from Portuguese municipalities is
particularly well-suited for this purpose. First, the mayor is the principal decision-maker in
the municipality and is in a position from which he can manipulate important expenditure
items for election purposes. Second, all Portuguese municipalities operate under the same
institutional framework and have access to the same policy instruments. This allows us to
avoid many of the pitfalls associated with cross national studies.3 Finally, election dates
are xed and exogenous from the perspective of the local authorities, and all municipalities
have elections on the same day.
Our estimations are consistent with the underlying theory. We nd that the magnitude
of the opportunistic distortion increases the win-margin and conversely, that the win-
margin has a negative e¤ect on the opportunistic distortion. We interpret this as saying
that opportunism, on the one hand, pays o¤. On the other hand, politicians are more
willing to distort policy choices when faced with a close election race and the (expected)
win-margin is small.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and derives the two
3Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Rosenberg (1992) were the rst to test political budgetary cycles using
local data. For an extended revision of the empirical literature about the U.S. see Besley and Case (2003).
For studies about Germany see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). For Sweden see Petterson-Lidbom
(2001). Finally, see Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia, Drazen and Eslava (2005) for Colombia,
and Veiga and Veiga (2007) for Portugal.
3
equations to be estimated. Section 3 discusses the data sources, institutional informa-
tion about the Portuguese municipalities, and the empirical strategy adopted. Section 4
presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusions.
2 Theory
In this section, we lay out a version of the rational political business cycle model developed
by Rogo¤ (1990) and Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988). The purpose of the exercise is, rstly, to
draw out implications of the theory which have not yet been subject to systematic testing
and, secondly, to allow theory to guide our empirical identication strategy.
2.1 The model
We consider a simple two-period economy (t = 1; 2) populated with a continuum of citizen-
voters.4 Citizen-voters care about private consumption (ct) and two types of public goods
(g1;t and g2;t+1). Spending on public good 1 (g1) is visible and observed immediately within
the period. Spending on public good 2 (g2), on the other hand, is hard to observe and, as a
consequence, citizen-voters cannot infer how much was spent on this good until later (with
a one period time lag) when they observe the provision levels generated by past spending.
For simplicity, we shall refer to public good 1 as an "observable" and to public good 2 as
an "unobservable" public good, respectively. The life-time utility from public goods of a
representative citizen-voter is
uv = c1 + ln g1;1 +  ln g2;1 +  (c2 + ln g1;2 +  ln g2;2) ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and  is the relative importance of unobservable
public goods.5 Each citizen-voter is endowed with y units of a non-storable good each
period, pays the lump sum tax  t and consumes ct = y    t. Public goods are produced
from tax revenues by an elected politician using a simple linear technology:
g1;t + g2;t+1 =  t + "t (2)
4The model is a simplied version of Rogo¤ (1990).
5We assume that g2;1 = 1.
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where "t is a stochastic competency term. We note that the cost of the unobservable public
good provided in period t+ 1 is incurred in period t.
Each period a citizen-voter is elected to run the government and to produce public
goods. To simplify the analysis, we assume that  is exogenously given and that the
politician, therefore, only has to decide on the allocation of resources between the two
types of public goods. Citizen-voters di¤er with respect to their talent for being politicians
and some are more competent than others. Specically, a citizen-voter is either competent
("t = "H) or incompetent ("t = "L < "H) as a politician. We assume that competency
is permanent, i.e., if a politician is competent in period 1 he is also competent in period
2 and vice versa. The probability that a randomly selected citizen-voter is competent is
 2 (0; 1). Politicians derive utility from private and public goods, but also care about
holding o¢ ce per se because of the power or prestige that goes with it. To capture this,
we assume that politicians receive the ego-rent m per period in o¢ ce.
In addition to competency and the implied provision level of public goods, citizen-voters
also care about the ideology of their elected politician. This is modelled as a random shock
to citizen-voterspreference for the incumbent relative to that of the challenger in each
election. Specically, we assume that the advantage (or disadvantage) of the incumbent
at time t is
t =   t; (3)
where  and  are parameters and  > 0. The random variable t captures ideological
shocks. It is drawn before each election from a symmetric unimodal distribution F (t)
with zero mean and variance one. We assume that F is di¤erentiable and denote the
density function by f . The ideological shock lasts for one period only and is unrelated to
competency. The parameter  captures the average incumbency advantage (or disadvan-
tage).
The information structure of the model can best be laid out by listing the timing of
events:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent observes his competency "1 and decides
on how to allocate resources between the two public goods (g1;1; g2;2).
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2. Voters observe 1 and how much is provided of the observable public good (g1;1).
3. At the end of period 1, an election takes place where the incumbent runs against
a randomly chosen challenger. The incumbent is reelected if he is supported by a
majority of citizen-voters; otherwise the challenger takes o¢ ce.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the incumbent, if reelected, decides how much to
spend on the observable public good.6 If the challenger is elected, she observes her
competency ("2) and decides on how much to spend on the observable public good.
We notice that the incumbent in period 1 does not observe the ideological bias (t)
until after he has decided scal policy for the period. This, as we shall see, implies
that he cannot be sure about the outcome of the election. He does, however, know the
distribution and that allows him to form a judgement about how big or small his advantage
is on average.
The structure described above is a sequential game of incomplete information and the
natural solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is a pair of rst-
period scal allocations

gL1;t; g
H
1;t
	
, one for each type, and a reelection rule for citizen-voters
(that determines the probability of reelecting the incumbent as a function of observed scal
policy) such that the incumbent of each type selects an optimal scal allocation given the
reelection rule; citizen-votersreelection rule is optimal given their beliefs about the type of
the incumbent and the incumbents strategies; and beliefs are whenever possible updated
according to Bayess rule. To narrow down the set of equilibria, we shall impose additional
restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs below.
2.2 Equilibria
We begin by noting that the optimal scal policy in the second period is to invest all
resources in the observable public good and so g1;2 =  + "i irrespective of the type of the
second-period incumbent. Supposing that the rst-period incumbent is reelected, we can
6In period 2, nothing is invested in the unobservable public good because it is the last period.
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write the second-period utility of a citizen-voter, net of the benet of the unobservable
public good, as a function of the type of the rst-period incumbent as
W (i) = y    + ln( + "i) for i 2 fL;Hg; (4)
The corresponding net second-period utility if a challenger of unknown type is elected is
W (C) = y    +  ln( + "H) + (1  ) ln( + "L); (5)
where C represents "challenger". If citizen-voters only cared about provision of public
goods, then it is clear from these expressions that they would reelect an incumbent who
is known to be competent for sure and boot out an incumbent who is known to be incom-
petent. However, in practice citizen-voters also care about ideology and a representative
citizen-voter casts a vote in favour of the incumbent if and only if
b (g1;1)W (H) + (1  b (g1;1))W (L) W (C) + 1  0; (6)
where b (g1;1) represents the citizen-votersupdated beliefs (that the incumbent is of type
H) after having observed the rst-period investment in observable public goods. From the
point of view of the rst-period incumbent, who does not observe 1 until after he has
decided on scal policy, the probability of getting reelected is
(b (g1;1)) = F 

+
b (g1;1)W (H) + (1  b (g1;1))W (L) W (C)


(7)
which is increasing in the belief that the incumbent is competent.
Following Snyder (1989) and others, we say that the incumbent has an advantage in
the election if, under the condition that both types of incumbents choose the same level
of spending and thus b (:) = , the probability of reelection is greater than 1
2
. Notice that
for b (:) = ; we have
() = F



: (8)
Since F is symmetric and unimodal with zero mean, it is clear, then, that the incumbent
has an advantage if and only if  > 0. Moreover, the advantage is increasing in . On the
other hand, the incumbent has a disadvantage if and only  < 0.
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Faced with this reelection rule, the rst-period incumbent, whether competent or not,
decides how to allocate resources between the two types of public goods taking into account
how this choice a¤ects his reelection chances. Following Persson and Tabellini (1990,
chapter 5), it is convenient to dene the following two objects: the value of beeing reelected
and the cost of signalling. The (expected) value of being reelected for a politician of type
"i is
V ("i) = m+ (W (i) W (C)) : (9)
He gets the ego-rent for another period and benets (or not) from the fact that he, in
expectation, is more (or less) e¢ cient at providing public goods than a randomly chosen
challenger. We assume thatm is su¢ ciently large to make V ("L) > 0: The cost of signalling
is
C
 
gi1;1; "i

= ln

 + "i
1 + 

+  ln

 ( + "i)
1 + 

(10)
  ln gi1;1    ln
 
 + "i   gi1;1

:
Signaling entails a distortion of rst-period resources (too much is spent on observable
public goods and too little is spent on unobservable public goods). The cost of signalling,
therefore, is the di¤erence between the short-run optimal allocation of rst-period resources
between the two public goods and the actual choice of allocation (gi1;1).
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Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) The unique intuitive Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies is a separating equilibrium and is characterized by the following strate-
gies and beliefs:
1. An incumbent of type L sets gL1;1 =
+"L
1+
and gL2;2 =
(+"L)
1+
in period 1. If reelected,
he sets gL1;2 =  + "L in period 2.
2. An incumbent of type H sets gH1;1 = g
s
1;1 and g
H
2;2 =
 
 + "H   gs1;1

in period 1 where
gs1;1 = max

 + "H
1 + 
; gs

(11)
7With the logaritmic utility functions, the short-run optimal allocation is bgi1;1 = +"i1+ and bgi2;2 =
(+"i)
1+ .
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Figure 1: Separating Equilibria
with gs being dened as
gs = max

gjC (g; "L) = 
 

 b  gs1;1    b  gL1;1V ("L)	 : (12)
If reelected, he sets gH1;2 =  + "H in period 2
3. Citizen-votersposterior beliefs are b (g1;1) = 1 for all g1;1  gs1;1 and b (g1;1) = 0 for
all g1;1 < gs1;1 and the reelection rule is given by equation (6).
Proof. See Appendix
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 where we have drawn the cost of signaling
and the expected value of reelection for the two types of incumbents as a function of g1;1.
The expected value of reelection is always larger for a competent than for an incompe-
tent incumbent. This is because the former can provide more second-period public goods
than the average politician while the latter cannot. The cost of signaling is represented
by the parabolas with the competent incumbents cost of signaling shifted to the right
reecting the fact that it is "cheaper" for the competent incumbent to increase spending
on the observable public good from his short-run optimal level (+"H
1+
) than it is for the
incompetent incumbent to match it. In a separating equilibrium, an incumbent of type L
sets gL1;1 =
+"L
1+
and prefers to do so rather than pretend to be competent as long as gH1;1
is no less than gs. An incumbent of type H, on the other hand, is, if needed, willing to
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deviate upwards from his short-run optimal policy choice to signal to citizen-voters that
he is competent as long as the cost of signaling is no greater than the expected benet
of reelection. Any gH1;1 in the interval A, indicated with the bold line in the Figure, con-
stitute a separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. It is clear, however, that gH1;1 > g
s is
more costly to the competent incumbent and thus dominated by gH1;1 = g
s.8 The theory
therefore predicts that observable scal choices are distorted before the election because
competent politicians need to convince rational voters that they are indeed competent.
This is the Rational Political Business Cycle (RPBC).
We can dene the opportunistic distortion as


gH11  
 + "H
1 + 

; (13)
which is simply a measure of the size of the average political business cycle. At equilibrium,
gH11 is equal to g
s. The average reelection probability of the incumbent, which we shall call
the win-margin for simplicity, can be dened as

 b  gH1;1+ (1  )  b  gL1;1 ; (14)
which is the type-weighted ex ante probability that the incumbent is reelected. These two
objects are jointly determined at equilibrium. On the one hand, the degree of signalling is
a determinant of the win-margin because it a¤ects the equilibrium beliefs. On the other
hand, the win-margin, through its e¤ect on the reelection di¤erential between competent
and incompetent politicians, is a determinant of the size of the opportunistic distortion.
To see how they feed on each other it is useful to entertain the following thought
experiment. First, suppose that gH1;1 increases for whatever reason. When it hits g
s there
is an increase in the win-margin because type H separates out. Thus, the win-margin is
weakly increasing in the size of the opportunistic distortion. Second, suppose that the
win-margin widens for whatever reason. The impact on the opportunistic distortion is
somewhat complex. This is because what matters is not the win-margin as such but the
di¤erence between the reelection probability of a competent and an incompetent politician,
8Since reelection is random, pooling equilibria in which both types of incumbents chose g1;1 = +"H1+
in period 1 can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
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Figure 2: The relationship between incumbency advantage and the incentive to distort
scal policy to signal competency.

 b  gH1;1   b  gL1;1. If the reelection probability of type H increases faster than that
of type L, the opportunistic distortion becomes smaller and vice versa if it is the other way
around. Thus, the impact of the win-margin on the size of the opportunistic distortion is
non-monotonic depending on which of the two e¤ects dominates.
To see this last point more clearly, we can ask what happens to the opportunistic
distortion, at equilibrium, if one of the key exogenous determinants of the win-margin 
the advantage of the incumbent (captured by ) increases. This is shown in the next
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Incumbency Advantage) Assume that gs > +"H
1+
. An increase (decrease)
in the average advantage (disadvantage) of the incumbent ( ") reduces the incentive to
distort scal policy to signal competency if and only if
 >  ()  W (C)  W (H) +W (L)
2
; (15)
where 0 () > 0 and 
 
1
2

= 0. Moreover, an increase in incumbency advantage increases
the reelection chance of all types of incumbents.
Proof. See Appendix
The main implications of the proposition are illustrated in Figure 2. Recall that the in-
centive to distort scal policy to signal competency is controlled by the di¤erence between
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the reelection probability of a competent and an incompetent politician,  (1)    (0).9
This di¤erential is a quasi-concave function of , as illustrated in the gure for two dif-
ferent values of  (the probability that a randomly selected citizen-voter is competent).
The reason for this non-monotonicity is that incumbency advantage increases the election
prospect of all types of incumbents. Accordingly, when an increase in  increases the
prospect of the competent type more than that of the incompetent type, the incentive
to distort scal policy is enhanced. Conversely, the incentive is reduced if incompetent
politicians benet more from incumbency advantage than competent ones. From Figure
2, we see that the peak of the PBC depends on . When competency is scarce and only
a small faction of the population of potential politicians is competent ( < 1
2
), the PBC
peaks when the incumbent has a disadvantage. In contrast, when there is an abundance of
competent politicians in the population ( > 1
2
), the PBC peaks when the incumbent has
an advantage. Irrespective of the distribution of competency in the population, incum-
bency advantage eventually tempers the incentive to distort scal policy and @((1) (0))
@
becomes negative for  su¢ ciently large.
2.3 Empirical Implications of the Theory
We are interested in testing the relationship implied by the theory between the (average)
opportunistic distortion (OD) and the (average) win-margin of the incumbent (WM). As
discussed above, OD and WM are jointly determined at equilibrium. We can therefore
write the structural form of the model laid out above as
WM = h(OD;Z) (16)
OD = k(WM;X); (17)
where h and k are functions and X and Z are (possibly overlapping) vectors of other
determinants of the opportunistic distortion and the win-margin.
The theory of the RPBC imposes some restrictions on h and k. Firstly, since the
posterior belief that the incumbent is competent, b (g1;1), is non-decreasing in g1;1, the
9If gs < +"H1+ . the competent politician can signal his type without having to increase spending from
his most-preferred choice ( +"H1+ .). In this case, the reelection di¤erential ( (1)  (0)) between competent
and incompetent politicians has no e¤ect on the size of the opportunistic distortion of scal policy.
12
model predicts that opportunistic behavior pays o¤ in the sense that the win-margin
is (weakly) increasing in the size of the opportunistic distortion ( @h
@OD
 0). Secondly,
although the theory predicts that the win-margin is a determinant of the size of the
opportunistic distortion, it does not pin down the sign of the e¤ect uniquely. An important
source of variation in the win-margin is variation in incumbency advantage. Given that
proposition 2 suggests that the opportunistic distortion is a quasi-concave function of
the win-margin, increasing at rst, then decreasing. We shall therefore in the empirical
specication of k allow for the possibility of such a non-monotonic relationship and let the
data determine what shape it takes.
Both the win-margin and the opportunistic distortion are endogenous variables. Ac-
cordingly, to identify the links between them empirically, we need to impose restrictions
on the structural form. We use the theory to motivate some of these exclusion restric-
tions. Firstly, we note that the parameter , which controls the relative importance of
unobservable versus observable public goods, a¤ects the opportunistic distortion directly,
while its impact on the win-margin is indirect (through its e¤ect on the opportunistic
distortion). In particular, the larger is , the higher the cost of signaling and the lower is
gs and, ceteris paribus, the opportunistic distortion.10 More broadly, we can interpret 
as a measure of voter awareness of the opportunity cost of spending on easily observable
expenditure items. Secondly, the availability of funds () also has a direct (positive) ef-
fect on gs because the cost of signalling falls and the value of reelection (V ("L)) increases,
while the e¤ect on the win-margin is indirect. Thirdly, the ego-rent increases the benet of
reelection and directly increases the opportunistic distortion. Based on these observations,
it is reasonable to exclude factors that a¤ect voter awareness, the availability of funds and
the ego-rent from the equation for the win-margin. On the other hand, the opportunistic
distortion is unlikely to be directly a¤ected by general economic conditions, while these
10Di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect to  gives:
@C(:; "L)
@
= ln

 ( + "L)
1 + 

  ln ( + "L   gs) + 1
 (1 + )
> 0:
This implies that @g
s
@ < 0. Since
(+"H)
1+ also decreases in , the overall e¤ect on the opportunistic
distortion is ambiguous.
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factors are likely to a¤ect the win-margin directly. We shall build on this identication
strategy in the empirical specication below and dene X and Z accordingly.
3 Data and Empirical Specication
The data set consists of political, nancial and economic variables for the 278 Portuguese
mainland municipalities, for the period 1979-2005. Municipal election dates and results
were obtained from the Technical Sta¤ for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Sec-
retariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral - STAPE) of the Internal A¤airs
Ministry. Data on municipal local accounts was obtained from the local authoritys (Di-
recção Geral das Autarquias Locais - DGAL) annual publication called Finanças Munici-
pais (Municipal Finances). This report exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2006. For
the two missing years data was obtained directly from the municipalitieso¢ cial accounts
and are incomplete: we have 182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 1985. The consumer
price index and the national unemployment rate were taken from the OECDs Main Eco-
nomic Indicators. Data on the total number of employees in rms within each municipality
and on their average wages, from 1985 to 2005, was obtained from the Quadros de Pes-
soal database, of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).11
Finally, demographic data was obtained from the National Statistics O¢ ce (INE).
The Portuguese municipalities were formally established by the Constitution of 1976,
after the bloodless military coup of April 25, 1974, which put an end to 48 years of
dictatorship. The rst municipal election took place in December of 1976. Until 1985
elections were held every third year and after that every fourth year. Election dates are
xed nationally and therefore exogenous from the perspective of the municipalities. During
our sample period (1979-2005), all elections took place in December, except for an election
in October of 2005, and there were no legal restrictions on the number of times a mayor
could stand for election.
11The Quadros de Pessoalis a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all privately
owned rms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).
Unfortunately, there is no data on wages for 2001. In order to avoid missing values, for each municipality,
we set the wages for 2001 equal to the simple average between those of 2000 and 2002.
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The municipalities are governed by the Municipal Assembly and the Town Council.12
The Municipal Assembly has deliberative power and it approves the general policy frame-
work. The presidents of the councils of the freguesias,13 which make up each municipality,
are automatically members of the Assembly, while the rest are elected directly by the vot-
ers registered in the municipality. The Town Council holds executive power and it designs
and implements local policies. Its members are all elected directly by citizens who vote for
party or independent lists of candidates.14 The top candidate from the list that receives
the most votes becomes mayor. The mayor is the president of the Town Council and plays
a leading role in the executive and has substantial power and autonomy.
Portuguese municipalities are responsible for a large variety of activities, ranging from
urban planning and territory organization to the supply of local public services and regula-
tion. The local public services controlled by the municipalities include sewage, distribution
of water and energy, local transportation and communication, elementary education, pat-
rimony, promotion of culture and science, provision of recreation and sports facilities,
local health care, social housing, environmental protection and municipal policing. The
municipalities operate within the same institutional framework and are all subject to the
same nancial regime.15 ;16 With this common regime, the municipalities are nancially
autonomous and can, without authorization from a higher-ranked authority, dene their
own budget, collect the revenues they are entitled to by law and allocate expenditures.17
Nonetheless, the Town Council and the mayor who heads it have relatively little discre-
tionary power with regard to revenues, as, on average, 70% of per capita revenues are
transfers from the central government and/or from the European Union. Moreover, the
12Law 169/99 establishes the competencies and the legal framework for the various branches of the
municipalities.
13Freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities. They are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.
14Votes are transformed into seats using the Hondt method. After all the votes have been tallied, the
following quotient (V/(S+1)) is calculated for each party, where V is the total number of votes that the list
received and S is the number of seats that the party has been allocated so far (initially 0 for all parties).
The party having the highest quotient gets the rst seat allocated, and its quotient is recalculated given
its new seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.
15During the period analyzed four local nance laws were introduced: Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84,
Law 1/87, and Law 42/98.
16For a detailed description of municipal nances in Portugal, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
17They are of course subject to several control mechanisms by central government agencies, but these
are merely inspective.
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bulk of current expenditures go to salaries, expenditures on electricity, water, etc., and are
largely non-discretionary and hard to manipulate. Importantly, however, the mayors can
control the level and timing of capital expenditures (of which investment expenditures are
the main component), which, along with the fact that these are highly visible spending
items, make them appropriate targets for mayors willing to woo voters to win elections.
As discussed above, our empirical model consists of a system of two simultaneous equa-
tions: a vote function representing the win-margin and an equation for the opportunistic
distortion. We measure the win-margin of the incumbent as the di¤erence between the
vote share of the mayors party and that of the largest opposition party. We measure the
opportunistic distortion as the percentage deviation of investment expenditures (IE) in
an election year from the election term average.18 The later choice is motivated by the fact
that opportunistic distortions are, in practice, most likely to show up in budgetary items
whose timing of implementation is controlled by the mayor and which are visible to the
electorate. As noted above, the municipalities do not have much freedom to set revenue
instruments, as transfers from the national government represent the main source of fund-
ing, and current expenditures are strongly conditioned by salaries which are regulated by
rigid labor contracts. Accordingly, investment expenditures, which are largely controlled
by the mayors, are the most likely place to look for evidence of opportunistic behavior.19
Based on the discussion of exclusion restrictions above, we can expand equations (16)
and (17) as follows:
WMit = 1ODit + 2IEit + 3YMit + 4RRit (18)
+5WMi;prev:el: + 6GPit + 7Empit
+8Wagesit + i + t + it
ODit = 0WMit + 1 (WMit)
2 + 2IEit + 3YMit + 4RRit (19)
+5CTtmit + 6CTit + 7Pop65it
+8PopDensit + 9Rightit + i + 't + it
18In the empirical tests, we will also use the percentage deviation of investment expenditures from their
trend (obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott lter), as a robustness check.
19For results indicating that opportunism occurs in investment expenditures, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
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where i = 1; :::::; 278 is the index for municipalities and t indicates election years.20 Both
equations include municipal xed e¤ects (i and i) and election year xed e¤ects ('t and
t). 1 to 8 and 0 to 9 are parameters to be estimated and it and it are random
error terms with E(it) = E (it) = 0. Our main objective is to estimate jointly the e¤ect
of opportunism (OD) on the win-margin (WM) and the e¤ect of the win-margin on the
degree of opportunism. The theoretical analysis suggests that 1 > 0 and that 0 > 0 and
1 < 0.
We divide the exogenous variables into three groups. The rst group contains three
variables that are included in both equations. They are: average investment expenditures
during the election term preceding the election of year t (IE); the number of years the
incumbent mayor has been in o¢ ce (YM); and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the in-
cumbent mayor runs for reelection and 0 otherwise (RR). We expect that low average
investment expenditures (IE) make it easier to be opportunistic and to create a large per-
centage deviation of investment expenditures from the average at election times (2 < 0).
We also expect that average investment expenditures are positively related to the win-
margin as voters reward mayors for keeping investments high on average throughout the
term (2 > 0). We expect that the number of years the incumbent mayor has served
(YM) reduces the win-margin because, as documented by e.g., Mueller (1970), Frey and
Schneider (1978a,b) and Veiga and Veiga (2004a), popularity tends to erode with time in
o¢ ce (3 < 0), and that mayors with longer tenures are more experienced and so are more
able to manage investment expenditures opportunistically (3 > 0). Likewise, the party
of the incumbent mayor is expected to do better when the mayor runs for reelection than
when a new, often unknown, candidate is presented (4 > 0). Finally, we expect that
mayors who do not run for reelection (RR = 0) are unwilling to incur the cost of signalling
and thus would not attempt to increase investments opportunistically (4 > 0).
The second group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the win-
margin. Firstly, it includes two variables which are directly related to the availability of
20The election years are 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2005. The election of 1979 is not
included in the analysis whenever lags, term averages or deviations from term averages are included. For
the three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) there is only election data for 2001
and 2005.
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funds, namely the average capital transfer from the national government during the pre-
ceding election term (CTtm) and the election year change in the capital transfer (CT ).
Theory suggests that the availability of funds, here represented by transfers, increases the
opportunistic distortion in election years without having a direct e¤ect on the win-margin.
We expect that 5 and 6 are positive. Secondly, the second group also includes two
variables that are related to voter awareness which, as suggested by the theory, tends to
reduce the magnitude of the political business cycle. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004),
in their study of the budget cycle in Russian regions, use education and urbanization to
measure voter awareness. Unfortunately, data on educational attainment at the munici-
pality level is not available for the time period analyzed in this paper. But, in Portugal,
older people have, on average, much less education than younger people. Thus, we can
use the percentage of the population over 65 years of age (Pop65) to proxy for low average
education levels21 and use population density (PopDens) to proxy for urbanization. We
expect Pop65 to be associated with low and PopDens to be associated with high levels of
voter awareness and we predict that 7 > 0 and 8 < 0. Finally, this group also includes
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the mayor belongs to a right-wing party (Right).
We have no prior on the sign of 9.
The third group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the oppor-
tunistic distortion. According to Carsey and Wright (1998), the electorate may wish to
reward, or punish, the national government in second tier (local) elections. Since voters
tend to punish the national government for bad economic outcomes,22 higher unemploy-
ment rates should lead to a lower percentage of votes for incumbent mayors who belong to
the same party as the national government. We capture this with the variable GP which is
the interaction between a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the mayor belongs to
the same party as the prime minister of Portugal and the national unemployment rate.23
A negative sign is expected for 6. Since voters are expected to reward mayors who achieve
high levels of municipal employment (Emp) or high average municipal real wages (Wages)
21The same applies to the illiteracy rate, which will also be used in the empirical analysis.
22For evidence on the Portuguese case, at the national level, see Veiga and Veiga (2004a,b). For a survey
of the international literature, see Paldam (2004).
23The interacted variables will also be included in the estimations of equation (19).
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during their tenure, we also expect 7 and 8 to be positive. Finally, we include the win-
margin in the previous election (WMi;prev:el:). This variable picks up unobserved factors
such as the mayors personal characteristics and ideology and party a¢ liation of voters.
We expect persistence in voter preferences (and thus in voting behavior) and predict that
5 is positive.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Since the win-margin measures the
di¤erence in the percentage of votes between the incumbent and his main opponent, it
assumes a negative value in case of defeat. The win-margin in the previous election must
be positive, since it refers to the results obtained by the incumbent mayor. The average
of the percentage deviation of investment expenditures from the election term average is
positive, indicating that mayors tend to behave opportunistically.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Equations (18) and (19) are estimated as a system of simultaneous equations, using
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) which is a robust estimator in that it does not
require information of the exact distribution of the disturbances.24 GMM estimation is
based upon the assumption that the disturbances in the equations are uncorrelated with a
set of instrumental variables. In our estimations, the set of instrumental variables of each
equation includes all exogenous right-hand side variables of both equations (including mu-
nicipal and time dummies). The GMM estimator selects parameter estimates so that the
correlations between the instruments and disturbances are as close to zero as possible, as
dened by a criterion function. By choosing the weighting matrix in the criterion function
appropriately, GMM can be made robust to heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation of
unknown form.25
24This is an advantage relative to FIML, which assumes that the contemporaneous errors have a joint
normal distribution
25In the presence of heteroskedasticity the GMM estimator brings e¢ ciency gains relative to Three-Stage
Least Squares (3SLS).
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4 Results
The results of the estimation of equations (18) and (19) using GMM are reported in the
rst four columns of Table 2. Robust t-statistics are shown in parenthesis and the levels
of statistical signicance of the estimated coe¢ cients are signalled with asterisks. The
number of observations and the adjusted R-squared for each equation are also reported.26
[Insert Table 2 here]
There is clear support for the main prediction of the RPBC model: opportunism pays
o¤, as the opportunistic distortion has a statistically signicant positive e¤ect on the
win-margin in all specications of equation (18). In the equation for the opportunistic
distortion, we allow, as suggested by the theory, for the possibility of a non-monotonic
relationship between the win-margin and the scal distortion. We see that the win-margin
has a highly statistically signicant negative e¤ect on the opportunistic distortion and
that the the quadratic term it is never signicant.27 This suggests that most of the data
points in our sample fall on the downward sloping part of the relationship. In other words,
the data strongly supports the prediction that incumbent politicians can increase their
reelection chances by inating spending in the year before an election and that they have
most reason or incentive to do so when they expect their win-margin to be small.28 The
later result is consistent with the theory of the RBPC. In fact, there are good reasons
to think that the win-margin over the relevant range should have a monotonic negative
impact on the scal distortion. Firstly, in practice, competency is likely to be scarce,
i.e., that  < 1
2
. The main reason is that ability is widely believed to be drawn from
26The specications include dummy variables for municipalities (municipal xed e¤ects) and election
years. In order to check if results were sensitive to the geographical dummies chosen, two alternatives were
also implemented. First, dummies for districts replaced the municipal xed e¤ects (there are 18 districts
in mainland Portugal). Second, we included dummy variables for three of the four population categories
that, according to the Portuguese law, are used to determine the mayorswages. Results, available upon
request, are virtually identical to those obtained when using municipal dummy variables.
27Since the variable WinMarginSquared is never statistically signicant when included (see columns
1 and 2), it was excluded from the estimations of columns 3 to 6. Wald tests allow for this exclusion. For
the same reason, it was not included in the estimations of Tables 3 and 4.
28Results are very similar when the percentage deviation of investment expenditures from their trend
(obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott lter) is used as the proxy for the opportunistic distrortion.
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a left-skewed distribution (e.g., a log-normal distribution).29 Secondly, a large empirical
literature has established that incumbents have an advantage in winning elections.30 This
suggests that  is likely to be positive. Taken together the two observations suggest that
over the empirically relevant range, the relationship between win-margin (as induced by
variations in incumbency advantage) and the scal distortion is negative and monotonic
(as illustrated by the bold segment in Figure 2).
Concerning the magnitude of the e¤ects, a one-percentage point increase in the op-
portunistic distortion, increases the win-margin by approximately 0.06 to 0.08 percentage
points, while a one-percentage point increase in the win-margin decreases the opportunis-
tic distortion by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points. Although the rst e¤ect may seem small,
if a mayor, in the election year, doubles investment expenditures relative to their election
term average, the win-margin increases by 6 to 8 percentage points, which could be the
di¤erence between winning and losing a close election. The second e¤ect implies that a
one-standard deviation increase in the win-margin decreases the opportunistic distortion
by 10 to 16 percentage points.
Our estimates also give support to some of the secondary hypotheses. Firstly, from
the estimates of equation (18) there is evidence that the win-margin is persistent, that
time in o¢ ce reduces the win-margin, and that the mayors party does better when the
incumbent runs for reelection. Contrary to our expectations, mayors belonging to the same
party as the national government are not penalized in municipal elections for high national
unemployment.31 But, there is evidence that they are penalized in general, irrespective
of the state of the economy, as the dummy variable Government Party is always statis-
tically signicant with a negative sign. This may indicate that Portuguese voters wish
to avoid the concentration of national and local powers in the same party, or that they
use their vote in local elections to express their discontent with the national government.
Municipal employment (Emp) and average real wages (Wages) turned out to be statisti-
29This observation is, for example, the basis for virtually all applied work on optimal taxation (see, e.g.,
Tuomala, 1990).
30See, e.g., Tompkins (1984), Levitt and Wolfram (1997) or Carson et al. (2007).
31This interaction is only statistically signicant in the specication reported in column 1, and with
the wrong sign. Replacing the national unemployment rate by the ination rate or GDP growth produces
similar results.
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cally insignicant in the specication reported in column 1. Since the inclusion of these
variables reduces the sample size substantially, because data on employment and wages
is available only from 1985 onwards, we decided to exclude them from the specications
reported in the following columns and tables. Since the national unemployment rate and
its interaction with the dummy for the government party are not statistically signicant
in column 3, they were excluded from the estimations of the following columns.
Secondly, from the estimation of equation (19), we note that the data supports the
hypothesis that opportunism is greater when the incumbent runs for reelection, when
she belongs to a left-wing party (Right = 0), and when there are increases in capital
transfers from the national government in the election year. Contrary to our expectations,
opportunism depends positively on average investment expenditures over the election term.
Thus, mayors who spend more on average, also behave more opportunistically. Although
average capital transfers over the election term are not statistically signicant in the rst
two columns, they are, with a negative sign, in the following columns, indicating that
municipalities that receive smaller average transfers tend to behave more opportunistically.
Finally, the opportunistic distortion does not seem to depend on the number of years
the mayor has been in o¢ ce, on the percentage of the population over 65 years old,32
or on population density. Since these variables are never statistically signicant when
included, they were excluded from the estimation of column 4,33 which became our baseline
specication for the following columns and tables.
To check the robustness of these results to alternative system estimation methods, we
also performed the estimations using Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Full Infor-
mation Maximum Likelihood (FIML). 3SLS can be seen as the two-stage least squares
version of the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) method, which estimates the para-
meters of the system accounting for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation
in the errors across equations. It is both consistent and asymptotically e¢ cient. 3SLS
is an appropriate technique when right-hand side variables are correlated with the error
32When the illiteracy rate is used instead, it is seldom statistically signicant. Thus, there is no robust
empirical evidence that the opportunistic distortion is a¤ected by these proxies of voter awareness.
33It is worth noting that Wald tests allow for all the exclusions of variables referred to above.
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terms and there is both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the resid-
uals. FIML is the asymptotically e¢ cient estimator for linear and nonlinear simultaneous
models, under the assumption that the disturbances are multivariate normal. When this
assumption fails, FIML may still be asymptotically e¢ cient. An advantage of 3SLS and
GMM over FIML is that the model does not have to be fully specied; the estimates for
the equations and parameters can be consistent even if the exact form of the rest of the
model is unknown. One caveat of 3SLS and FIML is that they propagate to the system
any specication error in the structure of the model. The results obtained when using
these two alternative system estimation methods are reported in columns 5 (3SLS) and 6
(FIML) of Table 2. They are very similar to those of column 4 (GMM). Thus, regardless of
the system estimation method chosen, there is clear empirical support for the theoretical
predictions.34
The evidence presented in Table 2 reported ndings of opportunistic distortions in in-
vestment expenditures. In Table 3, we report the results for other expenditure categories.
Although the two main predictions of the RPBC model still receive empirical support in
the specication with total expenditures (column 1), results are weaker than those obtained
for investment expenditures: the opportunistic distortion is only weakly statistically signif-
icant in the estimation of equation (18) and the coe¢ cient on the win-margin in equation
(19) is much smaller (-0.217 against -0.508). While the results for total capital expendi-
tures35 are similar to those for investment expenditures (column 3), the results for current
expenditures (column 2) do not accord with theory. However, as explained in section 2,
Portuguese mayors have relatively little control over current expenditures and it is, there-
fore, not surprising that these are not opportunistically managed. Additionally, current
expenditures are much less visible than investment expenditures, which makes them less
attractive for opportunistic manipulation. Finally, in column 4, we used the subdivision of
investment expenditures for which Veiga and Veiga (2007) found the most convincing evi-
34In order to save space, we will only report GMM results in the following tables (3 and 4). But, it is
worth noting that those obtained when using 3SLS or FIML are very similar, and are available from the
authors upon request.
35Total capital expenditures are composed of investment expenditures and capital transfers to freguesias
(lower level of local government).
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dence of opportunism - Miscellaneous Construction (overpasses, streets, rural roads, etc.).
Here results are clearly supportive of the theoretical models predictions. Furthermore,
the coe¢ cient of -0.610 for the win-margin in the estimation of equation (19) is greater
in absolute value than any of those obtained for other expenditure items, indicating that
the opportunistic distortion is greatest for this expenditure item.36 Since the coe¢ cient of
0.088 for the opportunistic distortion in the estimation of equation (18) is also the highest
obtained in tables 2 and 3, Miscellaneous Construction is also the expenditure item for
which opportunism pays o¤ the most. This is in accordance with our expectations as it is
the expenditure item that includes the most visible municipal investments .
[Insert Table 3 here]
In the rst two columns of Table 4, we report results for an alternative specication
where we use the level of investment expenditures in the election year instead of the
percentage deviation of investment expenditures from their election term average as a
measure of the opportunistic distortion. Since the former is highly correlated with the
election term average, the later variable was excluded from equation (18). In equation
(19), investment expenditures in the previous year replaces the term average of those
expenditures, in order to better account for the persistence in this series.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Results are very similar to those of Table 2. Again, opportunism pays o¤, as higher
investment expenditures in the election year lead to a larger win-margin for the incum-
bent party. Also as expected, investment expenditures in the election year are larger the
smaller the (expected) win-margin is. Compared to the specication with deviations from
the election term average (column 4 of Table 2), there is, however, less evidence that
opportunism depends on the mayors ideology. On the other hand, the election term av-
erage of capital transfers is highly statistically signicant, with a positive sign, in all the
specications reported in Table 4. Results obtained for total expenditures (column 3) and
36These results are consistent with those of Drazen and Eslava (2005), who also nd evidence of pre-
electoral manipulation of the composition of spending.
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capital expenditures (column 4) are similar, although total transfers seem to have smaller
e¤ects on the win-margin.
5 Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature on political business cycle by proposing and implement-
ing a new test of the RPBC. The test explores the two-way relationship implied by the
theory between the incumbent win-margin and the size of the opportunistic distortion.
The empirical results clearly support the hypothesis that opportunism pays o¤, as greater
expenditures in the election year (when compared to the election term average or, simply
in euros per capita) lead to greater vote di¤erences between the incumbent and her main
opponent. There is also evidence of persistence in vote di¤erences and of a negative e¤ect
of time in o¢ ce. Moreover, we nd that the mayors party does better when the incumbent
runs for reelection, but does worse when it also controls the national government. Over
the empirically relevant range, we nd that the magnitude of scal distortion is inversely
related to the win-margin. Thus, the opportunistic distortion is biggest when the incum-
bency advantage is small. Opportunism will also be greater when the incumbent runs for
reelection, when she belongs to a left-wing party, and when there are increases in capital
transfers from the central government in the election year.
These results are consistent with the prediction of the rational political business cycle
model and our analysis can be seen as a renement on previous tests of this theory which
have largely focused on nding pre-election distortions in scal variables. Our main inno-
vation is to acknowledge the interaction between the incentive to generate cycles and the
prospect of winning elections. Implementing this innovation on a large panel of Portuguese
municipalities, we nd support for the basic tenets of the RPBC model. Of particular in-
terest is the nding that the cycle is largest when the need to signal is at its peak. This
adds new insights to the recent literature on the political business cycle which show that
the context (e.g., new versus established democracies) matter for how and when political
cycles are generated. An important task for future research on political business cycles is
to identify and catalog the contexts that are most likely to generate cycles and based on
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that, to consider institutional reform that can help eliminate unwarranted uctuations in
scal and other economic variables.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We start by constructing the set of separating equilibria and
then impose restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to narrow down the set down to a
singleton and to rule out pooling equilibria. Let

gL1;1; g
H
1;1
	
denote candidate rst-period
equilibrium strategies of the two types of incumbents with gL1;1 6= gH1;1. Firstly, in any
separating equilibrium an incumbent of type Lmust chose the short-run optimal allocation
of rst-period resources, i.e., gL1;1 =
+"L
1+
. Thus, Bayess rule implies that b +"L
1+

= 0.
Under the assumption that citizen-voters hold pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs in the
sense that for any g1;1 6= gH1;1, b (g1;1) = 0, it would not be benecial for an incumbent of
type L to pretend to be of type H if
C
 
gH1;1; "L
   ( (1)   (0))V ("L) : (20)
Moreover, an incumbent of type H prefers to play gH1;1 rather than his short-run optimal
choice +"H
1+
if
C
 
gH1;1; "H
   ( (1)   (0))V ("H) : (21)
Notice that these the two intervals overlap, that any gH1;1 within this intersection is a
separating PBE and that the intersection may contain +"H
1+
. Call the intersection A.
Since for g1;1 2 A an incumbent of type H is worse o¤ the further away gH1;1 is from +"H1+ ,
all separating equilibria within A are dominated by gH1;1 = g
s (dened in equation (12))
and can be ruled out by assuming that citizen-voters hold the (out-of-equilibrium) belief
that the incumbent is of type H for all g1;1 2 A. Pooling equilibria in which both types
set g1;1 = +"H1+ can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) as in
Rogo¤ (1990).
26
Proof of proposition 2 From equation (12), we note that the incentive to signal com-
petency by distorting scal policy depends on
 (1)   (0) = F

+W (H) W (C)


  F

+W (L) W (C)


:
Calculate
@ ( (1)   (0))
@
=
f

+W (H) W (C)


  f

+W (L) W (C)



:
We note that @((1) (0))
@
 0) @gs
@
 0. Since F is unimodal and symmetric around zero,
it follows that @((1) (0))
@
 0 if and only if
+W (H) W (C)

  0  0  +W (L) W (C)

or
   ()  W (C)  W (H) +W (L)
2
: (22)
We note that 
 
1
2

= 0 and that 0() = ln( +"H)  ln( +"L) > 0. The observation that
the reelection probability of all types of incumbents increases in  follows immediately
from equation (7)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Name Variable 
Abbreviation
Obs. Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
Min. Max.
Win-Margin (vote difference) WM 2190 14.76 19.93 -72.62 87.93
Win-Margin in the previous election WMprev.el. 2202 19.29 14.59 0.02 87.93
Investment Expenditures InvExp 2078 213.49 162.36 0.00 1627.16
Investment Expenditures (Term Mean) IE 1931 196.81 131.11 16.00 1077.887
Opportunistic Distortion: % Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 
their Term Mean 
OD 1805 10.45 32.07 -88.51 169.52
Average Real Wages Wages 1656 549.04 141.19 283.32 1523.05
Capital Transfers (Term Mean) CTtm 1931 167.25 137.19 19.22 995.48
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
ΔCT 1826 9.33 39.02 -87.38 288.43
Government’s Party GovParty 2203 0.46 0.49 0.00 1.00
Municipal Employment Emp 2205 12.27 11.22 1.04 89.73
Population Density PopDens 2205 2.87 9.00 0.05 112.74
% Population Over 65 Years Old Pop65 2205 17.52 5.96 5.35 42.02
Right Right 2205 0.48 0.49 0.00 1.00
Run for Re-election RR 2115 0.79 0.40 0.00 1.00
Unemployment Rate (National) Unemp 2205 6.60 1.49 4.07 9.17
Years Mayor YM 2198 7.39 4.98 1.00 29.00
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
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Table 2: Opportunism and Vote Difference 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM 3SLS FIML 
Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Equation (18): Win-margin      
Opportunistic distortion  .060 
(2.31)** 
.075 
(3.10)*** 
.075 
(3.13)*** 
.080 
(3.31)*** 
.048 
(1.73)* 
.085 
(3.41)*** 
Investment Expenditures 
(Term Mean) 
.003 
(1.12) 
.004 
(1.27) 
.006 
(1.98)** 
.004 
(1.54) 
.005 
(1.82)* 
.004 
(1.28) 
Years Mayor -.359 
(-4.49)*** 
-.327 
(-4.06)*** 
-.300 
(-3.73)*** 
-.321 
(-4.12)*** 
-.329 
(-4.05)*** 
-.330 
(-3.88)*** 
Run for Re-election 8.421 
(8.16)*** 
8.890 
(9.34)*** 
8.963 
(9.43)*** 
8.857 
(9.28)*** 
8.901 
(8.48)*** 
8.873 
(7.36)*** 
Win-margin in previous 
election 
.581 
(16.5)*** 
.474 
(12.6)*** 
.451 
(11.9)*** 
0445 
(11.7)*** 
.442 
(15.3)*** 
.416 
(15.0)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Unemployment Rate 
1.979 
(3.70)*** 
.756 
(1.43) 
.694 
(1.33) 
   
Government’s Party  -13.886 
(-4.01)*** 
-8.921 
(-2.58)*** 
-8.445 
(-2.47)** 
-4.096 
(-5.40)** 
-3.748 
(-4.73)*** 
-3.397 
(-4.16)*** 
Unemployment Rate 
(national) 
.478 
(.96) 
1.372 
(2.78)*** 
.471 
(.98) 
   
Municipal Employment .002 
(.51) 
     
Average Real Wages .005 
(1.49) 
     
# Observations 1489 1740 1740 1740 1740 1740 
Adjusted R2 .22 .18 .18 .17 .18 .17 
Equation (19): Opportunistic distortion (% Deviation of Investment Expenditures from their Term Mean) 
Win-margin -.674 
(-2.50)** 
-.808 
(-2.98)*** 
-.508 
(-4.42)*** 
-.532 
(-4.62)*** 
-.665 
(-5.45)*** 
-1.117 
(-7.76)*** 
Win-margin squared .007 
(1.01) 
.009 
(1.48) 
    
Investment Expenditures 
(term mean) 
.003 
(2.24)** 
.031 
(2.33)** 
.041 
(3.11)*** 
.037 
(2.85)*** 
.045 
(3.81)*** 
.046 
(4.03)*** 
Years Mayor 0.012 
(.07) 
-.044 
(-.26) 
-.242 
(-1.41) 
   
Run for Re-election 7.290 
(2.67)*** 
8.507 
(3.37)*** 
8.333 
(3.38)*** 
8.674 
(3.49)*** 
9.947 
(3.90)*** 
14.909 
(5.21)*** 
Capital Transfers (Term 
Mean) 
-.007 
(-.47) 
-.008 
(-.60) 
-.051 
(-3.83)*** 
-.051 
(-4.00)*** 
-.047 
(-4.34)*** 
-.045 
(-4.66)*** 
% Change in Capital 
Transfers 
.344 
(11.2)*** 
.330 
(12.0)*** 
.343 
(12.4)*** 
.349 
(12.4)*** 
.343 
(15.6)*** 
.353 
(17.8)*** 
% Population Over 65 
Years Old 
-.089 
(-.43) 
.133 
(1.18) 
-.044 
(-.23) 
   
Population Density .173 
(1.30) 
.133 
(1.18) 
-.022 
(-.19) 
   
Right -6.768 
(-3.36)*** 
-7.434 
(-3.77)*** 
-7.647 
(-4.64)*** 
-7.426 
(-4.52)*** 
-6.948 
(-4.01)*** 
-5.268 
(-3.87)*** 
# Observations 1489 1740 1740 1740 1740 1740 
Adjusted R2 .26 .23 .19 .19 .17 .11 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by the method indicated at the top of each column. 
Models estimated with a constant and with dummy variables for municipal and time specific effects. T-
statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%. 
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Table 3: Opportunism in Other Expenditure Items 
 
 Total 
Expenditures 
Current 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Miscellaneous 
Construction 
 1 2 3 4 
Equation (18): Win-margin 
Opportunistic distortion .070 
(1.68)* 
-.077 
(-1.02) 
.051 
(2.05)** 
.088 
(3.24)*** 
Expenditures (Term Mean) -.00005 
(-.05) 
-.004 
(-1.64)* 
.004 
(1.64)* 
.004 
(1.03) 
Years Mayor -.311 
(-4.13)*** 
-.291 
(-3.67)*** 
-.315 
(-4.13)*** 
-.329 
(-4.17)*** 
Run for Re-election 9.427 
(10.0)*** 
9.687 
(10.3)*** 
9.125 
(9.69)*** 
8.889 
(8.49)*** 
Win-margin in previous 
election 
.453 
(12.1)*** 
.459 
(12.0)*** 
.460 
(12.2)*** 
.565 
(15.9)*** 
Government’s Party  -3.314 
(-4.41)*** 
-4.181 
(-5.39)*** 
-3.849 
(-5.11)*** 
-1.363 
(-1.70)* 
# Observations 1767 1767 1766 1489 
Adjusted R2 .19 .19 .20 .20 
Equation (19): Opportunistic distortion (% Deviation of Expenditures from their Term Mean) 
Win-margin -.217 
(-5.11)*** 
-.001 
(-.48) 
-.295 
(-4.27)*** 
-.610 
(-4.97)*** 
Expenditures (Term Mean) -.004 
(-1.54) 
-.032 
(-7.53)*** 
-.017 
(-2.06)** 
.045 
(2.52)** 
Run for Re-election 3.743 
(4.11)*** 
.425 
(.48) 
4.489 
(2.94)*** 
8.556 
(3.05)*** 
Transfers (Term Mean) .006 
(1.98)** 
.005 
(1.73)* 
.020 
(2.27)** 
-.046 
(-3.57)*** 
% Change in Transfers  .377 
(22.0)*** 
.106 
(5.56)*** 
.352 
(21.9)*** 
.368 
(12.1)*** 
Right -2.028 
(-3.30)*** 
-1.022 
(-1.48) 
-3.681 
(-3.49)*** 
-7.328 
(-4.01)*** 
# Observations 1767 1767 1766 1489 
Adjusted R2 .33 .26 .35 .17 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy variables for 
municipal and time specific effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The type of municipal expenditures considered in 
each model is indicated at the top of the respective column. Total transfers are used in columns 1 and 2, and 
capital transfers in columns 3 to 6. 
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Table 4: Expenditures and Vote Difference 
 
 Investment 
Expenditures 
Investment 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Total 
Expenditures 
 1 2 3 4 
Equation (18): Win-margin 
Opportunistic distortion 
(Expenditures) 
.008 
(3.14)*** 
.007 
(2.72)*** 
.006 
(2.67)*** 
.002 
(1.70)* 
Years Mayor -.404 
(-5.13)*** 
-.355 
(-4.615)*** 
-.333 
(-4.36)*** 
-.341 
(-4.48)*** 
Run for Re-election 8.861 
(8.56)*** 
9.399 
(10.0)*** 
9.417 
(10.0)*** 
9.651 
(10.3)*** 
Win-margin in 
previous election 
.580 
(16.9)*** 
.463 
(12.0)*** 
.468 
(12.4)*** 
.472 
(12.6)*** 
Government’s Party -1.492 
(-1.84)* 
-3.826 
(-4.98)*** 
-3.928 
(-5.13)*** 
-3.669 
(-4.80)*** 
Municipal Employment .055 
(1.14) 
   
Average Real Wages .007 
(1.90)* 
   
# Observations 1487 1738 1766 1767 
Adjusted R2 .22 .19 .19 .19 
Equation (19): Opportunistic distortion (Expenditures)  
Win-margin -.922 
(-3.26)*** 
-.987 
(-3.22)*** 
-.773 
(-2.81)*** 
-1.092 
(-3.50)*** 
Expenditures (-1) .839 
(23.8)*** 
.816 
(22.5)*** 
.650 
(17.5)*** 
.835 
(25.6)*** 
Run for Re-election 13.950 
(2.54)** 
12.542 
(2.17)** 
15.013 
(2.76)*** 
19.614 
(3.12)*** 
Transfers (Term Mean) .203 
(5.56)*** 
.258 
(5.94)*** 
.437 
(9.58)*** 
.275 
(7.88)*** 
% Change in Transfers 
(From Previous 
Year) 
1.351 
(16.5)*** 
1.272 
(16.1)*** 
1.298 
(17.1)*** 
2.785 
(18.4)*** 
Right -7.326 
(-1.79)* 
-7.326 
(-1.71)* 
-3.658 
(-.89) 
-12.927 
(-2.72)*** 
# Observations 1487 1738 1766 1767 
Adjusted R2 .78 .74 .80 .91 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy variables 
for municipal and time specific effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The type of expenditures considered in each 
model is indicated at the top of the respective column. Capital transfers in columns 1, 2 and 4, and 
total transfers are used in column 3. 
